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POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
JOHN O. MCGINNIS* 
 In this brief Comment I want to consider the relation of popular 
sovereignty to the Electoral College. First, I consider the often 
expressed claim that George W. Bush’s failure to receive a plurality 
of the popular vote undermines his legitimacy as President. I com-
pletely reject this notion: because presidential candidates attempt to 
win a majority of the Electoral College, not the popular vote, the 
popular vote totals are epiphenomenal and, in the close elections 
where the popular vote may diverge from the Electoral College re-
sult, do not undermine the electoral legitimacy of a candidate who 
won through playing by the rules. Next I consider whether the fail-
ure of the United States to use direct election undermines or in any 
way vitiates the political legitimacy of its system of government. I re-
ject this claim as well on several grounds. First, given the fickleness 
and inattention of voters, all we can expect an electoral system to do 
is to make certain that a candidate has substantial popular support. 
We cannot expect an election to measure the popular will in any 
transcendental sense, if by that we mean a stable will of a national 
majority. Given this fact, it makes sense for an electoral system to 
have other goals, like assuring a clear winner through minimizing 
the possibility of requiring a national recount. Second, even if it were 
possible to measure a stable majority, an electoral system designed 
to distill the will of a national majority would have a tendency to lead 
to notions of social democracy that are foreign to the American ex-
perience and are harmful to prosperity and liberty. 
 Both of the fine Articles I address in this Comment touch on the 
legitimacy of our presidential election system.1 I will necessarily con-
centrate on the parts that relate to my thesis, where I have some 
disagreement with the Articles. I thus pass over the many interest-
ing and persuasive observations that Professors Sandy Levinson and 
Ernest Young have made about whether the decision of the Texas 
electors to vote for both George W. Bush and Richard Cheney vio-
lated the Habitation Clause of the Constitution.2 In their paper, how-
ever, Professors Levinson and Young also label as the Twelfth 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. I want to thank Mark Movse-
sian and the participants in symposia at the Florida State University College of Law and 
at Cardozo for their comments. I am also grateful to Jim Rossi for his hospitality.  
 1. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel Charles, The Electoral College, The Right 
to Vote, and Our Federalism: A Comment on a Lasting Institution, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
879 (2001); Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth Amend-
ment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925 (2001). 
 2. See Levinson & Young, supra note 1, at 932-54. 
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Amendment’s “ultimate stupidity” its decision in the event no candi-
date gains a majority in the Electoral College to select a President 
through a state-by-state vote in the House rather than through a 
member-by-member vote.3 I will examine only one aspect of this 
claim—their objection that a state-by-state selection will make it less 
likely that representatives will take into account the identity of the 
winner of the popular vote in selecting the President. One of the 
premises of the Levinson-Young argument is thus that winning the 
popular vote in our electoral system as it is currently run provides 
electoral legitimacy to the winner.4 
 This assumption is incorrect. In the close elections where the re-
sult of the Electoral College and the popular vote are different, the 
popular vote result has no electoral meaning because the candidates 
were not in a contest for the popular vote. If they had been seeking 
the highest popular vote, they would have campaigned entirely dif-
ferently. George Bush would have campaigned more in Texas to run 
up the vote and Al Gore would have campaigned more in California. 
Both would have campaigned more in urban areas because it is eas-
ier to turn out the vote there. They would have run their television 
advertisements in different places and perhaps even run different 
advertisements altogether. Given the less than four-tenths of a per-
centage point difference between Bush and Gore, we cannot be cer-
tain who would have won the popular vote had the candidates been 
aiming for a popular majority. Giving any consideration to the popu-
lar vote in this context is like suggesting we should pay attention to 
the total number of runs a team got in the World Series rather than 
the number of games won.5 Accordingly, it is not entirely coherent to 
label those instances in which the college winner loses the popular 
vote as “misfirings” of the Electoral College. The fact that a candi-
date lost the popular vote while seeking an Electoral College major-
ity does not tell whether he would have won the popular vote if he 
had sought to win the popular vote, particularly because such misfir-
ings occur only in close elections. The interesting question of legiti-
macy is not whether losing the popular vote in an Electoral College 
system undermines the standing of the winning candidate given that 
system, but whether popular sovereignty demands that we have 
some form of direct election rather than the Electoral College. 
                                                                                                                    
 3. Id. at 970-73; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having but one 
vote . . . .”). 
 4. See Levinson & Young, supra note 1, at 950-54.  
 5. The World Series analogy has been previously appropriated by defenders of the 
Electoral College. See, e.g., Jeff Greenfield, The Hidden Beauty of the System, TIME, Nov. 
20, 2000, at 66. For a delightful discussion of the strengths and limitations of the World 
Series metaphor, see Michael E. Herz, How the Electoral College Imitates the World Series, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). 
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 The paper by Professors Luis Fuentes-Rohwer and Guy-Uriel 
Charles considers whether the Electoral College is illegitimate in this 
broader political sense, because it fails to include a mechanism of a 
popular vote.6 They conclude that the political legitimacy of the Elec-
toral College is bound up in our feelings about the legitimacy of fed-
eralism. I believe they are on the right track. Surely it is strange to 
consider the Electoral College system illegitimate because of incon-
sistency with one-man, one-vote, given the more substantial depar-
tures from that principle in our other governmental institutions. 
Most glaringly, the Senate’s 100 votes are awarded on a principle of 
geographic rather than popular representation, and the Senate is 
fully one-half of the most powerful branch of government. Moreover, 
the principle of representation embodied by the Senate is enshrined 
in the Constitution as the only provision that cannot now be 
amended.7 Compared to this affront to popular sovereignty at the na-
tional level the Electoral College seems a minor concern. 
 I would, however, add one important caveat to their discussion. 
The Senate advantages voters in small states by giving the voices of 
their representatives greater weight than the population of their 
state would warrant.8 The Electoral College is often thought to create 
the same kind of advantages because it awards a candidate a two 
electoral vote bonus regardless of size. Nevertheless, this assumption 
is wrong: so long as states retain the unit rule (the rule awarding all 
electoral votes to the victor of the state), its overall effect advantages 
voters in large states.9 The reason is that the vote of large state vot-
ers is more likely to be decisive because large states with their sub-
stantial electoral vote have a greater chance of being decisive in the 
Electoral College.10 Thus, on deeper inspection, federalism as repre-
sented by equal representation in the Senate and the Electoral Col-
lege are alike only at the abstract level, in that they both flout one-
person, one-vote. The imbalance that they create, however, moves in 
different directions. The Senate gives more power to voters in small 
states, but the Electoral College gives more power to voters in large 
                                                                                                                    
 6. See Fuentes-Rohwer & Charles, supra note 1, at 880. 
 7. See U.S. CONST. art. V. (“Provided . . . that no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
 8. The disproportionate representations of small states in the Senate gives them 
substantially greater power than large states to shape legislation. Lynn A. Baker & Sam-
uel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 21, 23-
29 (1997). 
 9. Robert W. Bennett, Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional 
Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG 241-42 (2001) (arguing that the Electoral College advantages 
voters in large states). 
 10. Professor John F. Banzhaf calculated that in 1968 a voter in a large state was 
3.312 times more likely to determine the outcome than a voter in a small state. John F. 
Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 
VILL. L. REV. 304, 313 (1968). 
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states.11 Indeed, a neglected argument in favor of the Electoral Col-
lege as it currently operates with the unit rule is the compensation it 
provides for the extra leverage that small state voters enjoy through 
the structure of the Senate.12 
 But the Electoral College can be defended on more fundamental 
grounds than federalism. It satisfies the two criteria that any elec-
tion system should meet in a democracy. It measures what can be 
measured of popular will and it enables democracy to fulfill its core 
function—impeding rulers from governing in their own interest or in 
other narrow interests rather than in the public interest. 
 First, in terms of measurement, all any presidential electoral sys-
tem can assure is that the President is supported by a substantial 
plurality chosen by rules that everyone understands and that will re-
flect major changes in popular sentiment. It is really impossible in 
close elections (and close elections are the only ones where the re-
sults of a direct election and the Electoral College could realistically 
diverge) to make sure that any political figure is supported by a sta-
ble majority of the electorate.  
 Second, in America, as opposed to some other societies, the expec-
tations of what democracy can deliver are fairly limited. For most of 
our history, the United States has embraced what David Held has 
called the protective idea of democracy.13 Under this conception, de-
mocracy is simply a mechanism that assures that government inter-
ventions will not be used to advantage a distinctive class of rulers. 
Democracy diffuses the power of governance throughout society so 
that politics will not interfere with the source of real happiness—
exchanges within the market and the family.14 For this conception to 
                                                                                                                    
 11. Judith Best explains who is advantaged by the Electoral College system as fol-
lows: 
It gives an advantage to intrastate majority and plurality voters; to voters in 
large states . . . , to tightly organized highly disciplined special-interest groups 
in large urban states; to voters in states that are losing population; and finally, 
to voters in low-turnout states. 
JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST THE DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF 
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 124 (1971). 
 12. Interestingly, the advantages of the Electoral College for voters in large states 
and disadvantages for small states are so misunderstood that small state Senators oppose 
any modification in the amendment. See, e.g., Hands off: The Electoral College Has Served 
the Nation Well; There’s No Need for Major Changes., SUNDAY NEWS, Nov. 12, 2000, at P2 
(discussing Senator Daschle of South Dakota’s support for the Electoral College because of 
the help he believes that it gives to small states). Their opposition points to a problem that 
should be more studied in political and legal theory. Rules may be so complicated that po-
litical actors misperceive their own interests and thus it is confusion, as well as self-
interest, that moves legislators and other lessor political actors. 
 13. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 99 (2d ed. 1996). 
 14. Held recognizes that the protective concept of democracy grows out of the classical 
liberal tradition and favors democracy because it is conducive to allowing individuals to 
pursue their own goals, free from government interference. Id. at 96. 
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become a reality, one simply has to make sure that rulers who are 
unduly rewarding their coalition at the expense of the majority are 
thrown out. The Electoral College accomplishes this goal as well as 
direct election of the President. 
 Let me take these points in order. First, given the realities of 
modern democracy, the best an electoral process can do is assure that 
we sift candidates with some support rather than measure stable 
majoritarian support. An election that is so close that a direct elec-
toral vote would not accord with the Electoral College vote is an elec-
tion where the margin of error is greater than a stable measure of 
popular support.15 Indeed, if the weather patterns had been different 
across the country we would well get different results in a close con-
test, regardless of whether we used a direct election or the Electoral 
College. If the election were held a few days later by the accident of 
the calendar we also might get a different result. Indeed, if the 1976 
election had been held a week later Gerald Ford would perhaps have 
defeated Jimmy Carter in the Electoral College.16 The sad truth is 
that many swing voters make up their minds based on accidents and 
presentations of personality around the time of the election and, 
given this weak attachment, will likely change their minds about the 
candidates when elected for similarly frivolous reasons.17 
 Accordingly, in a democracy with a fickle and rationally ignorant 
electorate, our presidential selection system, however devised, cannot 
choose a clear winner between closely matched candidates in a mean-
ingful sense of a candidate with a clear and stable support. What our 
Electoral College system accomplishes as well as a popular vote sys-
tem is to eliminate candidates without a substantial basis of support, 
such as Pat Buchanan and Ralph Nader, from any serious prospect 
that they will become President.18 It also assures as well as a direct 
election that any substantial shift in voter sentiment is measured 
election from election. 
 The appropriateness of the Electoral College also rests on the lim-
ited function that democracy can reasonably play in legitimizing our 
                                                                                                                    
 15. Cf. John Allen Paulos, We’re Measuring Bacteria With a Yardstick, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 2000, at A27. 
 16. See GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL 437 (1979) (discussing the good economic 
news that came out a week later and that might well have made a difference in the very 
close contest). 
 17. See STANLEY KELLEY, JR., INTERPRETING ELECTIONS 144-56 (1983) (discussing the 
uninformed nature of marginal voters and their influence on electoral outcomes). 
 18. I recognize that the Electoral College permits the House of Representatives to 
choose the candidates receiving the third largest number of electoral votes and, thus, it 
might be argued that formally we could have gotten Buchanan or Nader, assuming that 
the Constitution was interpreted to allow the House to choose a candidate who tied for 
third by receiving no votes. The fact remains that through 200 years of American history 
the Electoral College has never resulted in the choice of a candidate without substantial 
support in the population. 
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system of government. The Framers’ defense of democracy was that 
it better restrains arbitrary government action than aristocracy or 
monarchy and therefore better protects liberty.19 It is liberty that in 
large part legitimizes society by generating material and spiritual 
progress. Madison summed up the objective of sound constitutional 
mechanisms, including democracy, as devices “[t]o secure the public 
good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at 
the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government 
. . . .”20 Mancur Olson has put a more modern gloss on this idea. In 
his recent book he suggested that political systems were justified in-
sofar as they empowered the encompassing interest of society be-
cause that interest, rather than special interests, was less likely to 
use the government to expropriate resources for themselves.21 This 
kind of democracy facilitates the exercise of private rights and the 
creation of conditions for prosperity. 
 From this perspective of protective democracy, the Electoral Col-
lege certainly fares no worse than direct election of the President. 
Both guarantee that whoever wins the Presidency will have to be re-
strained by popular will. George Bush cannot rule in the interests of 
a narrow group because he and his successor must win very substan-
tial support. Both assure that major shifts in public sentiment will, 
over time, affect government policy. 
 The Electoral College may in fact contribute better to the goals of 
protective democracy than direct popular election of the President in 
three other respects. First, political stability contributes to prosperity 
and the exercise of individual rights, and nothing harms stability 
more than disputes about elections. The acrimony and bitterness 
flow from the simple fact that politics is a zero-sum game. One can-
didate and his coalition must win at the expense of the other candi-
date and his coalition. Social order, a sine qua non of prosperity, can 
begin to unravel. The aftermath of the recent election should embla-
zon this truth onto the annals of political science, as it showed all 
kinds of groups seeking to influence an unclear or doubtful electoral 
count. 
 For instance, as soon as it became clear that the vote was close, 
Vice President Gore’s camp began making charges of illegality 
about the butterfly ballot.22 Jesse Jackson led a march of Democ-
ratic partisans in Tallahassee, comparing the confusion with infa-
                                                                                                                    
 19. For further discussion of this concept of democracy, see John O. McGinnis & Mark 
L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 526 (2000). 
 20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 21. MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY, OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND 
CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 14-17 (2000). 
 22. See Charles M. Madigan, Battle for the White House, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 2000, at 
1.  
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mous racist attacks in Selma, Alabama.23 Republicans sent Capitol 
Hill staff to Florida in an attempt to influence the deliberations of 
canvassing boards. A cascade of partisan accusations followed.24 
 Political principles—another system of beliefs that contributes to 
social order—also tend to disappear when the stakes become high. 
For instance, the Democrats demanded that every vote count while, 
at the same time, they tried to exclude military ballots.25 Republicans 
believed that technicalities should not bar military ballots, but they 
did not extend this laxity elsewhere.26 
 Given that lack of clarity in high stakes politics dissolves social 
harmony, it is actually more important that a close election have a 
clear result than that it pick the candidate with the most votes.27 Of 
course, the lack of clarity in this last election was unfortunate, but 
think of how much worse it would have been if there was a close na-
tional vote with recounts in every state, not just Florida. At least the 
unpleasantness was localized. The Electoral College has advantages 
over direct election because it contributes to localization and con-
tainment of potentially destabilizing electoral disputes.28 
                                                                                                                    
 23. Thomas B. Edgall, Rage Sharpens Conservative Rhetoric, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 
2000, at A19 (recounting Jackson’s comparison). 
 24. Paul Lamatire, GOP Sent T-Shirt Team of Redicated Infiltrators, PALM BEACH 
POST, Dec. 1, 2000, at 1A.  
 25. Steve Wilson, Gore’s Actions Don’t Match His Lofty Words, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Nov. 30, 2000, at A2 (noting inconsistency between the Gore campaign’s position on count-
ing military votes and counting other ballots). 
 26. Two-faced in Florida, THE DES MOINES REG., Nov. 27, 2000, at 12 (accusing Re-
publicans of hypocrisy for applying strict standards to domestic ballots and lenient stan-
dards to military ballots). 
 27. The recent election also contained lessons about the appropriate nature of gov-
ernment. In contrast to the social acrimony that politics always threatens to engender, 
market transactions can make both sides better off, leading to more cooperation and social 
peace. Happily, the Framers bequeathed to us a commercial republic with a federal gov-
ernment granted only enumerated powers and restrained by the separation of powers, and 
state governments constrained by competition for people and capital. See generally John O. 
McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective, 21 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195 (1997) (discussing how the Framers’ system limited govern-
ment). That system, as weakened as it has been by excessive centralization and the loosen-
ing of property rights, is what stood between us and real chaos in the streets this Novem-
ber. Although the President is the most powerful actor in our government, his authority 
remains highly circumscribed by other governmental institutions and the market. Even 
when the outcome of the presidential election was unclear and subject to partisan pres-
sure, most people, other than committed partisans, could go about their business confident 
in the stability provided by other governmental institutions and by commerce. 
 The moral of the Florida unpleasantness is therefore that our essential task as a people 
is to maintain the decentralization of power in America through preserving a republic 
where commerce is strong and government power is held in check. The travails of the 2000 
election season, as trying as they were, will have been worth enduring if citizens emerge 
with a keener appreciation of the limits of government. 
 28. See BEST, supra note 11, at 193 (suggesting that the Electoral College insulates 
the nation from infection by local fraud). 
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 Second, because an Electoral College system forces candidates to 
speak more widely in the country than in direction election, the con-
cerns of a more diffuse population will be addressed. For instance, 
the concerns of rural voters who dominate some states are more 
likely to be discussed. Addressing the hopes and fears of the entire 
electorate is the therapeutic side of an election. Citizen whose con-
cerns are addressed (even if not satisfied) are less likely to cause so-
cial unrest. The irenic catharsis engendered by an electoral system 
that focuses on disparate issues thus promotes the stability. 
 Finally, and most importantly given that the Electoral College 
system has been around for 200 years, its results are more likely to 
be accepted without question. One of the most striking facts of the 
2000 election was that the citizenry, in general, readily accepted that 
the winner of Florida, and thus the Electoral College, would become 
President, rather than the winner of the popular vote.29 That is due 
not only to the longevity of the Electoral College but also to its re-
sults. The United States is a prosperous and powerful country—
perhaps the most prosperous and powerful country on earth. Millions 
of people want to immigrate here each year and, even if they cannot 
immigrate, billions more want to emulate as much of our culture as 
possible. 
 Of course, it is entirely possible that a direct presidential election 
system may not fundamentally change the political system that has 
contributed to our prosperity. Nevertheless, it is difficult to know ex 
ante exactly what rules would replace the electoral system and thus 
whether they would serve us as well in practice, particularly given 
the complex relation of the Electoral College system to its other rules 
like the composition of the Senate.30 The Burkean argument for re-
taining the status quo for fear that we will not be able to understand 
the secondary and tertiary effects of change is here particularly 
strong.31 Changing complex rules in a highly reticulated system regu-
lating the distribution of political power is an enterprise where we 
should especially consider the warning spoken by the character of 
Ulysses in Troilus and Cressida: “[U]ntune that string, [a]nd hark 
what discord follows.”32 
                                                                                                                    
 29. See Ann Althouse, Electoral College Reform: Deja Vu, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 993, 1011 
(2000). 
 30. For instance, I suggested above that the advantage the Electoral College gives to 
voters in large states may compensate for the additional leverage small states voters ob-
tain through the composition of the Senate. 
 31. Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, 
THE CONVENTION AND THE PARTY SYSTEM (1971) (making similar argument against chang-
ing fundamental rules in the complex American political system). 
 32. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HISTORY OF TROILUS AND CRESSIDA, act I, sc. 3 (A. Har-
bage ed., 1969). 
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 Nevertheless, if one believes in the model of social democracy or 
what David Held in his canonical book on the models of democracy 
calls “participatory democracy,” the Electoral College may still seem 
very unsatisfactory.33 Oversimplifying a bit, under this model, indi-
viduals meet in politics in a process of continuous social reform to 
solve all sorts of problems that are deemed to be collective rather 
than those of individuals.34 Under such a model, the legitimacy of all 
social institutions depends ultimately on voting. Thus, even if it is 
impossible to capture a stable majority will, it may be important to 
appear to do so for reasons of symbolism. 
 Accordingly, it is not surprising that as the United States flirted 
with more social democratic ideas, courts became more sympathetic 
to one-man, one-vote notions as the touchstone of the democracy.35 In 
fact, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, at the height of social 
democratic stirs, hearings were held on abolishing the Electoral Col-
lege.36 
 But in my view, the model of social democracy is so deficient that 
the Electoral College’s rejection of the symbolism of unmediated 
popular sovereignty is one of its greatest virtues. In my view, the no-
tion of popular sovereignty as the ultimate and sole legitimating 
force on our social arrangements has had a corrosive effect on society. 
This is a subject as large and important as any in political science, 
and I can give my reasons only briefly in this Comment. Originally 
introduced as useful restraint on the absolute power of kings, the 
concept of popular sovereignty has metamorphosized into a danger-
ous concept of social democracy for two reasons.37 First, popular sov-
ereignty has tended to make it harder to recognize that society is le-
gitimated not by majority will but by its accordance with certain 
principles of natural justice, like the right to liberty and property. 
Indeed, historically, popular sovereignty has been often more effec-
tive at destroying the customary structures and mediating institu-
tions that protect natural rights than monarchs, because monarchi-
cal authority was hedged in by customary law and other restraints 
                                                                                                                    
 33. HELD, supra note 13, at 271. 
 34. Id. at 270-73. 
 35. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-68 (1964) (interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause to require one-man, one-vote). 
 36. See LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE REFORM 139-78 (2d ed. 1972) (detailing progress and ultimate failure of Electoral 
College reform). 
 37. See Bertrand De Jouvenal, ON POWER, ITS NATURE AND THE HISTORY OF ITS 
GROWTH 265-67 (1948) (discussing the original usefulness of the English parliament). 
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where popular sovereignty was thought to have fewer or no con-
straints because it was rooted in the people themselves.38 
 Second, popular sovereignty has also historically given rise to the 
notion that the government collectively is responsible in an unmedi-
ated way for the welfare of its citizens. Government, however, cannot 
accomplish such an ends in an unmediated way, because government 
lacks the motivation and information to help individual citizens di-
rectly. The best government can do most of the time is to establish an 
infrastructure of the rule of law to allow its citizens to better exercise 
their rights of liberty and property—structures which collect the in-
formation and elicit the complex cooperation necessary to generate 
wealth and human flourishing. Historically, the United States has 
done better than other modern industrial societies, like those in 
Europe, in realizing this more modest and paradoxically more suc-
cessful vision of government. 
 Of course, I am not claiming that the Electoral College by itself 
has been entirely responsible for preventing the corrosive effects of 
popular sovereignty transmuted into social democracy. Other aspects 
of the United States have contributed our advantage over European 
democracies in this respect. But the Electoral College does play an 
important symbolic role. For instance, in retaining an important role 
for federalism, the Electoral College expresses American preference 
for decentralization over a single point of collective sovereignty. In a 
larger sense, by including within the election of our nation’s leader 
the principle of subsidiarity, which is itself a principle facilitating the 
exercise of natural rights, we are reminded correctly that the legiti-
mating principles of society cannot be reduced to a momentary exer-
cise of the general will. Instead, popular consent is simply an in-
strument to protect the deeper and more enduring principles that 
make us a free and prosperous people. 
                                                                                                                    
 38. Id. at 288-91 (discussing the manner in which popular sovereignty sweeps away 
other institutions); see also Brian C. Anderson, The Melancholy Liberalism of Bertrand De 
Jouvenal, 143 PUB. INT. 87, 93 (2001) (summarizing De Jouvenal’s thesis). 
